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This paper shows that foreign aid has a signi￿cant positive average
e￿ect on real per capita GPD growth if, and only if, the quantitatively
large negative reverse causal e￿ect of per capita GDP growth on foreign
aid is adjusted for in the growth regression. Instrumental variables esti-
mates yield that a 1 percentage point increase in GDP per capita growth
decreased foreign aid by over 4 percent. Adjusting for this quantitatively
large, negative reverse causal e￿ect of economic growth on foreign aid
yields that a 1 percent increase in foreign aid increased real per capita
GDP growth by around 0.1 percentage points.
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11 Introduction
Does foreign aid have a positive, causal e￿ect on economic growth? I show that
the answer to this important policy question is yes if, and only if, one takes into
account that economic growth itself has a quantitatively large, negative within-
country e￿ect on foreign aid. The aid e￿ectiveness literature is well aware of
this endogeneity problem. However, one of the main problems that this litera-
ture continues to struggle with, is ￿nding a plausible time-varying instrumental
variable for foreign aid that satis￿es in the growth regression the exclusion re-
striction (e.g. Deaton, 2010; Temple, 2010). Despite standard macroeconomic
theory predicting a positive e￿ect of foreign aid on economic growth if part of
the foreign aid is used for investment, the consensus in the aid e￿ectiveness
literature is that foreign aid does not have a signi￿cant positive average e￿ect
on economic growth.1 I show that indeed one may arrive at this conclusion if
the negative reverse causal e￿ect of per capita GDP growth on foreign aid is
not accounted for in the growth regression. Once the negative reverse causal
e￿ect of economic growth on foreign aid is accounted for, estimates of the ef-
fect of foreign aid on economic growth are positive, statistically signi￿cant, and
economically meaningful.
My estimation strategy to identify the causal e￿ect of foreign aid on economic
growth is based on a two-step procedure. The two-step procedure is closely
related to the approach taken in the empirical macro literature to identify the
causal e￿ects of ￿scal policy (see, in particular, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 2
In the ￿rst step, I estimate the response of foreign aid to economic growth, using
rainfall and international commodity price shocks as instrumental variables to
generate exogenous variation in real per capita GDP growth for a panel of 47
LDCs during the period 1960-2000. In the second step, after the causal response
of foreign aid to real per capita GDP growth is quanti￿ed by the instrumental
variables estimates, I use the residual variation in foreign aid that is not driven
by GDP per capita growth as an instrument to estimate by two-stage least
squares the e￿ect that foreign aid has on per capita GDP growth. This two-
step estimation strategy enables to: (i) obtain an understanding of how foreign
1See for example Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard et al.
(2004), Easterly et al. (2004), Roodman (2007), Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007), or Ra-
jan and Subramanian (2008). These papers are well aware of the endogeneity problem and
address it using instrumental variables techniques. As Deaton (2010) and Temple (2010)
note, however, the instruments that these papers have used for foreign aid in cross-country
growth regressions are unlikely to ful￿ll the exclusion restriction. For a recent paper that uses
cross-industry data to examine the growth e￿ects of aid, see Rajan and Subramanian (2010).
These authors ￿nd that aid in￿ows have a negative e￿ect on the manufacturing share. While
such a within-country, across-industry approach certainly pushes the frontier of identifying
the e￿ects of aid by reducing concern of omitted variables, it still faces the important issue of
simultaneity bias.
2Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use information on the cyclical response of tax revenues
to adjust for the endogenous response of tax revenues to changes in GDP. The Blanchard
and Perotti approach has been widely used in the empirical macro literature as well as by
international organizations like the IMF to examine the e￿ects that changes in the cyclically-
adjusted ￿scal balance have on the macroeconomy (see e.g. Alesina et al., 2002; Fatas and
Mihov, 2003; or IMF, 2010).
2aid responds to per capita GDP growth at the macroeconomic level (hence,
providing useful information on the severity of the endogeneity bias if one fails
to adequately deal in the growth regression with the endogenous response of
foreign aid to economic growth); and (ii) compute an estimate of the e￿ect that
foreign aid has on economic growth that is adjusted for the reverse causal e￿ect
that growth has on aid.
My ￿rst main ￿nding is that increases in real per capita GDP growth of aid
recipient countries are associated with a statistically signi￿cant and quantita-
tively large reduction in foreign aid. An instrumental variables estimate yields
that a 1 percentage point increase in the real per capita GDP growth rate is
associated with a signi￿cant decrease in foreign aid by over 4 percent. This
result is consistent with the stylized cross-country fact that as countries grow
richer they rely less on foreign aid. It is also consistent with donor countries
acting as Good Samaritans: when the economy of the aid recipient country is
booming the Good Samaritan reduces aid, while in times of severe economic
di￿culties aid is increased.
An important implication of this ￿rst main ￿nding is that research on the
e￿ect of foreign aid on economic growth is complicated by a quantitatively
large, negative reverse causal e￿ect of economic growth on foreign aid. The
large, negative causal e￿ect of economic growth on foreign aid implies that the
cards in empirical research on aid e￿ectiveness are stacked against ￿nding in
the data a signi￿cant positive average e￿ect of foreign aid on economic growth.
I show that once the negative reverse causal e￿ect of per capita GDP growth
on foreign aid is adjusted for in the growth regression, that foreign aid did in-
deed have a signi￿cant positive average e￿ect on real per capita GDP growth.
My panel ￿xed e￿ects estimates yield that a 1 percent increase in foreign aid is
associated with a signi￿cant within-country increase in GDP per capita growth
of around 0.1 percentage points. These instrumental variables estimates are con-
sistent with the quantitative predictions of a Solow-Swan growth model where
a part of foreign aid ￿nances domestic investment. I also show that estimating
the e￿ect that foreign aid has on GDP per capita growth without taking into
account that there is a large, negative reverse causal e￿ect of economic growth
on foreign aid would lead to the (mistaken) conclusion that foreign aid has no
signi￿cant positive average e￿ect on real per capita GDP growth.
There are several reasons why the issue of the causal e￿ect that foreign aid
has on economic growth in the Least Developed Countries is important. First,
foreign aid ￿ows constitute a signi￿cant share of these countries’ per capita
income. On average the 1960-2000 share of net o￿cial development aid in GDP
was about 3 percent. Second, most of the foreign aid ￿ows are ￿nanced by tax
payer money. Western governments are accountable to voters and most of these
voters may not be receptive to much more information than whether on average
foreign aid had a positive causal e￿ect on economic growth. Third, the premier
World Millennium Development goal is to end poverty and hunger in the world’s
poorest countries. If one believes that per capita GDP growth is associated with
signi￿cant increases in the income per capita of the world’s poorest people, as
is suggested for example by Dollar and Kraay (2002), and if one cares about
3reducing poverty and hunger, then clearly it is important to have knowledge
about the causal e￿ect that foreign aid has on economic growth in the world’s
poorest countries. In sum: there is a ￿erce debate among growth economists
on whether western governments’ development strategies have worked (see e.g.
Je￿rey Sachs, 2005 vs. William Easterly, 2006) and the basic question of whether
on average aid had a signi￿cant positive e￿ect on growth of the aid recipient
countries has been of fundamental importance to this debate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the
estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main
results. Section 5 presents further robustness checks. And Section 6 concludes.
2 Estimation Strategy
2.1 Estimating the E￿ect that Economic Growth has on
Foreign Aid
Estimating the e￿ect that real per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid re-
quires an exogenous source of variation for real per capita GDP growth. To
generate such variation, I use smooth variations in rainfall and international
commodity price shocks as instrumental variables. 3 A key characteristic of the
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that makes this estimation strategy plausible
is that these countries are highly dependent on the agricultural and commodity
exporting sector.4 Hence, variations in rainfall and international commodity
prices can induce substantial variation in real per capita GDP growth vis-a-vis
changes in agricultural productivity and the terms of trade. Because rainfall is
random and the economic size of each LDC (as measured by the share in world
commodity production) is extremely small (so that the country can be e￿ec-
tively treated as being a price taker on the international commodity market)
the induced variations in per capita GDP growth will be exogenous to variations
in foreign aid and economic growth. 5
I estimate the e￿ect that real per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid
using two-stage least squares:
log(aidi;t) = ai + bt + clog(yi;t) + ei;t; (1)
where log(aidi;t) is the log-change of foreign aid per capita and log(yi;t) is the
log-change of real per capita GDP. 6 ai are country ￿xed e￿ects that capture long-
3Several papers have documented the signi￿cant e￿ect of rainfall and international com-
modity price shocks on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. See for example Deaton
(1999), Miguel et al. (2004), or Br￿ckner and Ciccone (2010a,b). Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries constitute about two-thirds of the 49 countries that are classi￿ed by the United Nations
as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The paper covers 47 of the 49 LDCs. The 2 LDCs
that are not covered in the paper due to missing GDP data are East-Timor and Myanmar.
4See the Data Appendix for further details.
5Conditional of course on country and year ￿xed e￿ects. See the equation below.
6This functional form follows Trumball and Wall (1994), who derive the panel ￿xed e￿ects
log-log speci￿cation based on a theoretical model where aid decisions of donors are motivated
4run (unobservable) di￿erences across countries that jointly determine changes
in foreign aid per capita and per capita GDP growth; bt are year ￿xed e￿ects
that capture global business cycle e￿ects and other global shocks that may be
jointly driving foreign aid and per capita GDP growth of the LDCs.
The excluded instruments (Z i;t) in the two-stage least squares estimation
of equation (1) are the log-changes of the international commodity price index,
rainfall, and rainfall squared (see Section 3 for a detailed description of how
these instruments are constructed). The exclusion restriction states that the
instruments should only systematically a￿ect the dependent variable (foreign
aid per capita) through their e￿ect on per capita GDP growth. The validity
of rainfall and commodity price shocks as excluded instruments in equation (1)
will be discussed and examined rigorously in Section 4.1.
2.2 Estimating the E￿ect that Foreign Aid has on Eco-
nomic Growth
If per capita GDP growth has a signi￿cant e￿ect on foreign aid (i.e. in equation
(1) c 6= 0) then OLS estimation of the e￿ect that foreign aid has on economic
growth will be biased. Speci￿cally, suppose that the e￿ect of foreign aid on
economic growth can be written as:
log(yi;t) = hi + it + klog(aidi;t) + mZi;t + ui;t; (2)
then cov(log(aidi;t);ui;t) 6= 0, and OLS estimation of k will be upward biased
if c > 0 and downward biased if c < 0.
This endogeneity bias, that is due to c 6= 0 in equation (1) can be evaded
however by (i) constructing an adjusted foreign aid series where the response of
foreign aid to per capita GDP growth is partialled out; i.e.:
log(aidi;t) = log(aidi;t)   clog(yi;t) (3)
and (ii) using this endogeneity adjusted aid series as an instrument for the orig-
inal aid series in equation (2). By construction, the IV estimator that uses the
endogeneity adjusted aid series log(aidi;t) as an instrument for log(aidi;t)
does not su￿er from the simultaneity bias. Moreover, beyond taking care of the
simultaneity bias, that is associated with the least squares estimation of equa-
tion (2), the IV estimator will provide a consistent estimate of the parameter
k under the assumption (exclusion restriction) that the error in equation (1)
is uncorrelated with the error in equation (2). If there are omitted variables
by the well-being of the aid recipient country. I use the log-change of foreign aid rather than
the level of foreign aid because the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) panel unit root test did
not reject the null hypothesis that the level of foreign aid has a unit root. The test rejected
however at the 1% level the null hypothesis that the ￿rst-di￿erence of the foreign aid series has
a unit root. Regarding cointegration, the panel cointegration tests developed by Westerlund
(2007) did not reject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration between the log-level of
foreign aid and the log-level of GDP per capita. Thus, panel cointegration tests do not point
to a signi￿cant exact common component between permanent shocks to the level of GDP per
capita and permanent shocks to the level of foreign aid.
5that are part of both, equations (1) and (2) the zero-covariance assumption
will be violated and the IV estimator will not solve the omitted variables prob-
lem. However, the IV estimator will still solve the simultaneity problem. The
Technical Appendix provides a formal proof for why an IV estimator that uses
the residual variation of foreign aid which is not driven by economic growth
does not su￿er from the simultaneity bias. The appendix also derives the omit-
ted variables bias of the least squares and IV estimator which arises when the
zero-covariance restriction is violated.
Note that the estimation strategy requires that the parameter c in equation
(1) is estimated consistently. Because of the simultaneous nature of the two
equations, OLS can not provide a consistent estimate of the parameter c in
equation (1) if k 6= 0 in equation (2). Moreover, because measurement error is a
real concern in national accounts statistics of developing countries (e.g. Heston,
1994; Deaton, 2005) the OLS estimate of the parameter c in equation (1) will
likely be attenuated towards zero. Hence, the need for instrumental variables
estimation of equation (1).
An issue arising with the estimation strategy in equation (2) is that the
adjusted aid series (aidi;t) is a generated regressor. Typically, the presence
of a generated regressor leads to standard errors on the slope coe￿cients that
are incorrect for purposes of hypothesis testing. 7 However, there is a special
case where the standard error on the slope coe￿cient of a generated regressor
is correct: namely, for testing the hypothesis that the slope coe￿cient is equal
to zero (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002, p. 141). In the aid literature
the debate has focused on the question of whether the e￿ect of foreign aid on
economic growth is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero. Hence, the special case
where the standard error on the slope coe￿cient of a generated regressor is
correct (i.e. the case for testing the hypothesis of a zero slope coe￿cient on
foreign aid) is the relevant one for this paper’s empirical analysis.
It is also important to note that the regressions reported in this paper are
based on annual data. The use of annual data allows to substantially increase
sample size and hence the power of statistical tests. In addition, the use of
annual data allows to take into account information on the short-run e￿ects
that foreign aid has on economic growth, which would be missed out on if
for example 5-year averages were used. The baseline estimates reported in this
paper therefore capture predominantly the impact e￿ect that aid has on growth.
In Section 5.3 I will discuss the results of distributed lag estimates that allow
to study also more medium/long-run e￿ects of foreign aid.
3 Data
Rainfall Data. I obtain data on annual rainfall for each of the 47 LDCs
during the period 1960-2000 from the Climate Research Unit (CRU) and the
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (TYN) of the University of East
Anglia. Speci￿cally, I use the TYN CY 1.1 version that has been developed
7Consistency of the estimator is of course not a￿ected by the use of a generated regressor.
6by Mitchell et al. (2003) and approved by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). The CRU/TYN rainfall data come at a high resolution
(0.5￿x0.5￿ latitude-longitude grid) and each rainfall observation in a given grid
is constructed by interpolation of rainfall observed by all stations operating in
that grid. Rainfall data are then aggregated to the country level by assigning
grids to the geographic borders of countries and weighting the observation in
each grid by surface area, using the cosine of the latitude (see Mitchell et al.,
2003 for more details).
International Commodity Price Shocks. The country-speci￿c interna-
tional commodity export price index ComPIi;t that captures shocks to the







where ComPricec;t is the international price of commodity c in year t, and c;i
is the average (time-invariant) value of exports of commodity c in the GDP
of country i. Annual international commodity price data are for the 1960-
2000 period from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics, and data on the value of
commodity exports are from the NBER-United Nations Trade Database. 8
GDP and Foreign Aid Data. The real per capita GDP data are from the
Penn World Tables (PWT), version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006). Data on net o￿cial
development aid are from the World Development Indicators (2009). 9
4 Main Results
4.1 IV Estimates of the E￿ect of Economic Growth on
Foreign Aid
Table 1 presents the baseline two-stage least squares estimates of the e￿ect that
real per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid. Column (1) shows the ￿rst-stage
estimates that link international commodity price shocks and rainfall ( Zi;t) to
real per capita GDP growth log(yi;t). All three instruments are individually
signi￿cant at least at the 1% level and yield a ￿rst-stage F-statistic of about
9.3. Increases in the international prices of exported commodities and improved
rainfall conditions are associated with a signi￿cant increase in the real per capita
8The commodities included in the index are: aluminum, beef, co￿ee, cocoa, copper, cotton,
gold, iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, and wood. In case there were
multiple prices listed for the same commodity a simple average of all the relevant prices is
used.
9I use net o￿cial development aid, de￿ned as grants and concessional loans net of repay-
ments, because this measure captures best the actual transfers to countries (see for example
Easterly, 2003, p. 29). I have chosen to focus on total o￿cial development aid, rather than
more speci￿c measures of aid, because if aid is fungible, as argued for instance in Devarajan
and Swaroop (1998), then conceptually it makes little sense to distinguish between di￿erent
kinds of foreign aid (see also Rajan and Subramanian, 2008).
7GDP growth of the LDCs. The negative quadratic term on the rainfall variable
captures that at some stage too much rainfall may be counterproductive for
agricultural productivity and hence for GDP per capita growth.
That the instruments Zi;t have also a signi￿cant reduced-form e￿ect on for-
eign aid log(aidi;t) is shown in column (2). Increases in the international
prices for exported commodities and improved rainfall conditions are associ-
ated with a signi￿cant decrease in foreign aid. Because the regression controls
for year ￿xed e￿ects, the reduced-form estimates are not driven by changes in
economic conditions of OECD countries that may in turn systematically a￿ect
movements of international commodity prices. Moreover, the country ￿xed ef-
fects take into account that some LDCs are more dependent on the agricultural
and commodity exporting sector than others, and that aid ￿ows may be deter-
mined by deep historical factors, such as for example colonial ties to a speci￿c
European country.
For comparison purposes with the second-stage estimates that are presented
in columns (4)-(8), column (3) shows the least squares estimates of the e￿ect
that real per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid. The least squares estimate
is negative and statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. However, if foreign aid
has a signi￿cant e￿ect on GDP per capita growth this point estimate can not be
taken as re￿ecting the causal e￿ect that per capita GDP growth has on foreign
aid. In fact, if foreign aid has a signi￿cant positive e￿ect on GDP per capita
growth, the least squares estimate of the e￿ect that GDP per capita growth has
on foreign aid will be upward biased.
Column (4) therefore presents the two-stage least squares estimate that uses
international commodity price shocks and rainfall as excluded instruments. The
second-stage point estimate on real GDP per capita growth from the two-stage
least squares regression is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level and in abso-
lute size much larger than the corresponding least squares estimate in column
(3). The larger absolute size of the coe￿cient from the two-stage least squares
regression could be due to a number of factors. First, if foreign aid has a posi-
tive e￿ect on GDP per capita growth the least squares estimate will be upward
biased. Second, measurement error in per capita GDP growth is a real issue for
the LDCs (see for example, Heston, 1994; or Deaton, 2005). To the extent that
this measurement error is classical it will attenuate the slope coe￿cient in the
least squares regression towards zero but not the slope coe￿cient in the two-
stage least squares regression. The Hausman test rejects that the least squares
estimate is equal to the two-stage least squares estimate at the 10% level (p-
value 0.067), thus pointing to a signi￿cant di￿erence between the least squares
and instrumental variables estimate.
Quantitatively, the two-stage least squares estimate in column (4) implies
that a 1 percentage point increase in real per capita GDP growth is associated
with an average reduction in foreign aid by over 4 percent. For this two-stage
least squares estimate to re￿ect the causal e￿ect that per capita GDP growth
has on foreign aid, it is necessary that the instruments ful￿ll the exclusion re-
striction. That is, rainfall and international commodity price shocks should have
no systematic e￿ects on foreign aid other than through GDP per capita growth.
8If for example rainfall and commodity prices a￿ect political institutions or the
risk of civil war beyond GDP per capita growth then the exclusion restriction
would be violated.
The p-value of the Hansen J-test on the overidentifying restrictions reported
in column (4) is 0.82. Hence, the Hansen J-test does not reject that the instru-
ments are uncorrelated with the second-stage error. To show also more intu-
itively that beyond per capita GDP growth there are no systematically large
direct e￿ects of international commodity price shocks and rainfall on foreign aid
I report in columns (5)-(7) two-stage least squares estimates when instruments
are added to the right-hand side of the second-stage equation. As can be seen,
the size of the coe￿cient on the international commodity price index conditional
on real per capita GDP growth (columns (5) and (6)) is less than one-third of
the size of the coe￿cient that is obtained in the reduced-form regression (col-
umn (2)). Statistically, the coe￿cient is also not signi￿cant at any conventional
con￿dence level. The coe￿cient on rainfall on the other hand ￿ips sign and is
also statistically insigni￿cant. These regressions that directly estimate the e￿ect
that the instruments have on foreign aid conditional on per capita GDP growth
therefore resonate the result of the Hansen J-test that did not reject the validity
of rainfall and international commodity price shocks as instrumental variables
for real per capita GDP growth in the aid equation. Column (8) shows that the
second-stage (and ￿rst-stage) relationship continues to hold when excluding all
those country-years where LDCs experienced a drought year, which could be
associated with an atypical in￿ux of foreign aid. 10
An issue that has received substantial attention in particular in the aid
literature is the robustness of results to outliers and the sample size. 11 To show
that within the LDC sample results are robust to the selection of a speci￿c
sub-sample and the exclusion of observations that may be deemed as potential
outliers Table 2 presents a variety of robustness checks. In column (1) only those
country-year observations are used for the two-stage least squares estimation
that produce a balanced panel for the 1960-2000 period. The point estimate on
the second-stage coe￿cient is in this case -5.47 and is statistically signi￿cant at
the 1% level. In column (2) the balanced sample is maintained, but all those
observations are excluded which are deemed as outliers by the Hadi (1992)
procedure.12 Excluding these outliers barely changes the second-stage point
estimate, but it does make the ￿rst-stage ￿t a bit more precise. In columns
(3)-(5) the sample period is elevated to cover the 1970-2000 period only. The
motivation for focusing on the 1970-2000 period is that some of the LDCs during
the 60s were still under colonial in￿uence of the European countries. Column
(3) presents the unbalanced panel estimates for the 1970-2000 period, while
10Drought years are identi￿ed using the publicly available data on natural disasters that
are provided by the Universite Catholic de Louvain’s Emergency Disaster database (EM-DAT,
2009).
11See for example Easterly et al. (2004) or Roodman (2007).
12The Hadi (1992) procedure for detecting outliers has been popularly used in the aid
literature. See for example Easterly et al. (2004) or Roodman (2007). The cut-o￿ signi￿cance
level chosen for the Hadi procedure is 5%.
9column (4) uses only those 39 LDCs that yield a balanced panel for the 1970-
2000 period. Column (5) excludes further potential outliers based on the Hadi
procedure. The main result is that per capita GDP growth continues to have a
signi￿cant negative e￿ect on foreign aid in all these regressions. Point estimates
range between -4.19 and -6.07 and their 95% con￿dence intervals span the point
estimate obtained in column (4) of Table 1. 13
4.2 IV Estimates of the E￿ect that Foreign Aid has on
Economic Growth
The results of the previous section showed that foreign aid is highly endogenous
to the per capita GDP growth of the aid recipient countries. Speci￿cally, the
instrumental variables estimates yielded that foreign aid decreased substantially
during times when per capita GDP growth of aid recipient countries increased.
Hence, an OLS estimate of the e￿ect that foreign aid has on per capita GDP
growth will su￿er from downward bias due to the reverse negative e￿ect that
per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid.
Panel A of Table 3 shows estimates of the e￿ect of foreign aid on per capita
GDP growth when adjusting for the large negative e￿ect that GDP per capita
growth has on foreign aid (for an explanation of how this is done see Section
2.2).14 Panel B reports for comparison purposes the OLS estimates. All regres-
sions continue to control for country and year ￿xed e￿ects.
The main message of the estimates in Panel A of Table 3 is that the e￿ect of
foreign aid on real per capita GDP growth is positive and signi￿cantly di￿erent
from zero at over 99% con￿dence when the negative reverse causal e￿ect of GDP
per capita growth on foreign aid is adjusted for. On the other hand, in Panel
B of Table 3 the OLS estimates, that su￿er from the negative reverse causal
e￿ect are either statistically insigni￿cant or signi￿cantly negative. These results
hold across a variety of di￿erent sub-sample speci￿cations and are robust to
the exclusion of observations that are deemed as potential outliers by the Hadi
procedure. Speci￿cally, the instrumental variables estimates in Panel A of Table
3 yield that a 1 percent increase in foreign aid is associated with a signi￿cant
13An additional criterion that is important for instrumental variables estimation to yield
consistent second-stage estimates is the ￿rst-stage relevance of the instruments. The ￿rst-
stage F-statistic in Tables 1 and 2 is between 7.8 and 15.8. According to the tabulations in
Stock and Yogo (2005), the maximal IV relative bias (maximal size distortion) is therefore
less than 5% to 20% (15% to 25%). The p-values reported in square brackets below the 2SLS
estimates in Tables 1 and 2 are based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical signi￿cance,
and a key property of this test statistic is robustness to weak instruments (see for example
Andrews and Stock, 2005). In Appendix Table 1 I show that using weak IV robust estimators
yields second-stage estimates that are very similar, both quantitatively and statistically, to
the two-stage least squares estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2. Appendix Table 2 also
shows that similar results are obtained if in addition to rainfall temperature is used in the
instrumental variables regression.
14The adjustment is done using the corresponding point estimates of the e￿ect that economic
growth has on aid from Tables 1 and 2, thus matching the sample size in each column of Table
3. Appendix Table 3 shows that there is also a signi￿cant reduced-form e￿ect of residual
foreign aid on economic growth.
10increase in real per capita GDP growth by around 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. 15
Panel A of Table 4 shows that there continues to be a signi￿cant positive
average e￿ect of foreign aid on economic growth when controlling for within-
country changes in political institutions and the risk of civil war. 16 Changes in
political institutions and the risk of civil war could have a direct and independent
e￿ect on foreign aid beyond economic growth if due to political reasons donors
prefer to give foreign aid to more democratic and peaceful countries. 17 For
within-country changes in political institutions and civil war to be an omitted
variable in the growth equation it would have to be the case however that
at the annual level a change in political institutions has an immediate e￿ect
on economic growth. Panel A of Table 4 shows that this is not the case for
political institutions but it is the case for civil war. The coe￿cient on the
Polity2 score that captures political institutions is statistically insigni￿cant and
quantitatively small while the coe￿cient on the civil war indicator variable is
negative and signi￿cant. Importantly, the average marginal e￿ect of foreign aid
on economic growth remains positive and highly statistically signi￿cant in all
these regressions.18
5 Further Issues
5.1 Cross-Country Parameter Heterogeneity
The log-log di￿erence speci￿cation (see equation (2)) implies that, cross-country
di￿erences in the e￿ect that a change in the level of foreign aid has on the level of
GDP per capita are di￿erenced out. However, it is likely that also the elasticity
e￿ect of foreign aid on GDP per capita growth di￿ers across countries (as would
for example be suggested by a standard Solow-Swan growth model; see Section
5.2 below). To check whether parameter heterogeneity leads to a bias in the
estimated average e￿ect, I use the mean-group estimator developed by Pesaran
and Smith (1995) that computes estimates country-by-country and then takes
a linear average of the obtained coe￿cients. Figure 1 plots the kernel density
function of the country-speci￿c slope estimates that are obtained from using as
an instrumental variable the residual variation in foreign aid that is not driven
by economic growth.19 The mean value of the country-speci￿c slope estimates
is 0.11, and thus matches closely the estimate of the average marginal e￿ect
reported in column (1) of Table 3 from the homogeneous panel ￿xed e￿ects
model.
15Appendix Table 4 shows that similar estimates are obtained when extending the sample
up to 2006 or when restricting the sample to the sub-group of Sub-Saharan African countries.
16The data on political institutions are from the Polity IV database. The data on civil war
are from the PRIO/UPSALLA database on armed con￿icts.
17See, for example, Trumball and Wall (1994), or Alesina and Dollar (2000).
18Panel B of Table 4 shows that increases in countries’ Polity2 scores are associated with sig-
ni￿cant increases in foreign aid while the civil war indicator is negative but mostly insigni￿cant
in the foreign aid regression.
19The reported estimates in Figure 1 are based on the largest possible sample (47 countries
during 1960-2000).
11Beyond providing an important robustness check on the average marginal
e￿ect obtained from the homogeneous panel ￿xed e￿ects model, the country-
speci￿c slope estimates provide useful information on the extent to which the
e￿ect of foreign aid on economic growth varies across countries. The interquar-
tile range of the country-speci￿c slope estimates is [0.05,0.15], with a sample
minimum (maximum) of -0.02 (0.35). Hence, there is quite a bit of variation in
the marginal e￿ect that foreign aid has on economic growth across countries,
which raises the interesting policy question of what determines this cross-country
variation.
One explanation for the cross-country variation in the marginal e￿ect of for-
eign aid on economic growth are cross-country di￿erences in economic policies.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) argued that the marginal e￿ect of foreign aid on
economic growth is particularly high in countries where policy-induced distor-
tions to economic activity are relatively small because in these countries aid is
more likely to be invested. 20 Figure 2 examines this claim empirically by plot-
ting the country-speci￿c slope estimates against the Burnside and Dollar (2000)
policy index that captures cross-country di￿erences in trade policy, in￿ation,
and budget balance. The scatter plot shows a positive relationship between
the country-speci￿c slope estimates and the (period-average) BD policy index.
Using the bootstrap to take into account the relatively small number of obser-
vations, a bivariate regression yields a coe￿cient on the BD policy index of 0.04
that has a t-value of 1.86. Hence, this is supportive evidence for the Burnside
and Dollar claim that foreign aid is particularly e￿ective in stimulating economic
growth in countries with good macroeconomic policies.
Dalgaard et al. (2004) found that aid is signi￿cantly less e￿ective in the
tropics. As noted by Rajan and Subramanian (2008), there is little theoretical
reason for why one would expect a systematically smaller e￿ect of foreign aid
on economic growth in countries which are located in the tropics. Figure 3
shows that regressing the country-speci￿c slope estimates on the share of tropical
terrain yields a negative, but statistically insigni￿cant relationship.
Another argument for cross-country heterogeneity in the marginal e￿ect of
foreign aid on economic growth, that has been popular in both academic and
policy circles, are ￿nancing constraints (see e.g. Sachs, 2005). Domestic and,
in particular, rural ￿nancial markets are often ill-functioning (or simply non-
existent) in many of the LDCs so that high return projects go unrealized because
(rural) investors fail to obtain ￿nance for their projects. An aid in￿ow may have
a high return if it successfully targets high return projects and eases ￿nancing
constraints in the (rural) ￿nancial markets.
Figure 4, Panels A-C explore the role of such ￿nancing constraints by plot-
ting the country-speci￿c slope estimates against various indicators that proxy
the severity of ￿nancial market imperfections. Panel A plots the relationship
between the country-speci￿c slope estimates and the World Bank credit infor-
mation index that captures the availability of credit information from either a
public registry or a private bureau to facilitate lending decisions. Panel B plots
20For a critique, see Easterly et al. (2004).
12the relationship between the country-speci￿c slope estimates and the percentage
share of individuals and ￿rms listed in a public or private credit registry with
current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding.
And, to capture that credit market imperfections are often most severe in ru-
ral areas of developing countries Panel C plots the relationship between the
country-speci￿c slope estimates and the percentage share of the population liv-
ing in rural regions. The main conclusion is that the marginal e￿ect of foreign
aid on economic growth is signi￿cantly increasing in these proxies for cross-
country di￿erences in the severity of ￿nancing constraints. Hence, the common
argument in favor of foreign aid ￿ the ￿nancing problem ￿ ￿nds support in the
data.
A strand of the aid e￿ectiveness literature has argued that there exists a
political economy resource curse of foreign aid on economic growth: in countries
with multiple powerful groups aid in￿ows may lead to costly rent-seeking activity
(e.g. Svensson, 2000; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). Figure 5, Panels A and B
explore this channel by plotting the relationship between the country-speci￿c
slope estimates and two measures that capture countries’ ethnic fragmentation.
Panel A plots the relationship using an index of ethnic fractionalization and
Panel B plots the relationship using an index of ethnic polarization. 21 Both
￿gures show a downward sloping relationship. Statistically the relationship is
however only signi￿cant at conventional con￿dence levels for the measure of
ethnic fractionalization, which may suggest that aid in￿ows can be a curse
primarily due to the common pool problem, rather than because they directly
increase the likelihood of civil con￿ict. 22
5.2 Comparison of IV Estimates to the Predicted E￿ect
from a Solow-Swan Growth Model
A useful way to check whether the instrumental variables estimates of the aver-
age marginal e￿ect are plausible not only in sign but also in size is to draw on
the ￿rst-order approximation of the e￿ect that a change in the investment rate
has on the output growth rate in a simple but standard Solow-Swan growth
model. The ￿rst-order approximation yields that a 1 percent increase in the
investment rate increases the output growth rate by  
1  percentage points,
where  is the convergence rate and  the capital-output elasticity. 23 If part of
the foreign aid is used to ￿nance domestic investment, the predicted growth rate
e￿ect (in percentage points) of a 1 percent increase in the share of aid in GDP is
21The fractionalization index increases with the number of groups, while the polarization
index is maximized when there are two groups which are of equal size. Both indices are
between 0 and 1, with larger values denoting more fractionalization (polarization). For a
discussion of conceptual di￿erences between polarization and fractionalization indices with an
application to the con￿ict literature, see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
22In fact, recent research by De Ree and Nillesen (2009) shows that an increase in foreign
aid is associated with a signi￿cant decrease in the likelihood of civil con￿ict.
23See for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003).
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1  times the marginal elasticity e￿ect that foreign aid has on investment. 24
Table 5 shows that on average this marginal elasticity e￿ect of foreign aid on
investment is around 0.15-0.3 percent.
To make the instrumental variables estimates comparable therefore to the
predictions of the Solow-Swan growth model, and in order to obtain an estimate
of the convergence rate , Table 6 shows that there continues to be a positive
and statistically signi￿cant e￿ect of foreign aid on the growth rate of GDP
per capita when controlling for convergence e￿ects in the level of GDP per
capita and using instead of the log of foreign aid the log of the share of foreign
aid in GDP. The system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998) for these
dynamic regressions, where the foreign aid share is instrumented by the variation
in the aid to GDP ratio that is not driven by GDP per capita growth, yields
estimates on the log of the aid to GDP ratio that range between 0.05 to 0.07
for the 1960-2000 period and between 0.03 to 0.06 for the 1970-2000 period.
Statistically, these estimates are signi￿cant at the 5 percent level at least. The
average annual convergence rate in the sample is estimated to be around 5 to
10 percent per annum.
With these estimates in hand, it is now possible to compare the instrumental
variables estimates of the average e￿ect that foreign aid has on economic growth
to the quantitative prediction from the Solow-Swan growth model. A typical
value used in the empirical growth literature for , that is reasonable for a
Solow-Swan growth model with investment in both, physical and human capital,
is 2/3 (see e.g. Durlauf et al., 2005). 25 Hence, the predicted average e￿ect of a
1 percent change in the aid to GDP ratio on the output growth rate is around
0.02 to 0.06 percentage points. This is in line with the instrumental variables
estimates reported in Table 6, which range between 0.03 to 0.07.
24Arellano et al. (2008) show in a DSGE model, where consumers are modeled to perfectly
smooth consumption over time, that whether an aid in￿ow increases investment depends on
the persistence of the aid shock. A fully permanent aid shock increases consumption, with
little e￿ect on investment ￿ a result that follows from the Permanent Income Hypothesis. It
is questionable however whether the Permanent Income Hypothesis is a good approximation
of consumption choices in the LDCs. Empirically there exists evidence that for the LDCs
the Permanent Income Hypothesis is not a good approximation, mainly because of ￿nancing
constraints (see, for example, Deaton, 1992).
25Note that in the Solow-Swan growth model there exists a tight relationship between the
convergence rate  and the output-capital elasticity . In particular, it holds that  =
(1   )(n + g + d), where n and g are the population and TFP growth rates respectively,
and d is the depreciation rate (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). The average sample
population growth rate is about 2.5 percent and a reasonable value for annual TFP growth
is about 1 to 2 percent. An  of 2/3 and an estimated convergence rate of 5 to 10 percent
would therefore require a depreciation rate of the capital stock of between 10 to 25 percent
per annum. For the LDCs, where weather conditions are often extreme, this may not be
unreasonable. Bu (2006), for example, presents ￿rm data evidence for Ghana, Ivory Coast,
Kenya, and Zimbabwe with average depreciation rates on ￿xed assets (resp. machinery and
equipment) that range between 10 to 20 percent (resp. 15 to 40 percent).
145.3 Level E￿ects vs. Growth E￿ects
The Solow-Swan growth model predicts that a permanent increase in foreign
aid a￿ects GDP per capita growth along the transition to the new steady-state.
However, due to the assumption that there are decreasing returns to scale in
capital the Solow-Swan growth model predicts that an increase in foreign aid
has a level e￿ect but not a long-run growth e￿ect. The empirical results so far
are consistent with both a level e￿ect and a growth e￿ect. This is because the
￿rst-di￿erence speci￿cation that relates the log-change in GDP per capita to
the log-change in foreign aid has an analogous level form representation where
the log of GDP per capita is related to the log of foreign aid.
To examine whether beyond a level e￿ect an increase in foreign aid has also
an e￿ect on the long-run GDP per capita growth rate, I include as an additional
right-hand-side regressor in the growth equation the log of the level of foreign
aid. This approach follows the empirical growth literature that has tested for
long-run growth e￿ects of investment. 26 In the growth equation, the estimated
coe￿cient on the level of foreign aid re￿ects the e￿ect that foreign aid has on
the long-run GDP per capita growth rate while the estimated coe￿cient on the
log-change of foreign aid re￿ects the e￿ect that foreign aid has on the level of
GDP per capita.
Table 7 reports the estimates for the largest possible sample of 47 countries
during the 1960-2000 period. The main result is that the estimated coe￿cient on
the level of foreign aid is statistically insigni￿cant and quantitatively small. On
the other hand, the estimated coe￿cient on the log-change of foreign aid is pos-
itive, highly statistically signi￿cant, and quantitatively large. Table 7 therefore
shows that a permanent increase in foreign aid has a signi￿cant positive e￿ect
on the level of GDP per capita but an insigni￿cant e￿ect on the long-run GDP
per capita growth rate. This result holds for both the static and the dynamic
panel data model (columns (1) and (2)). And, it also holds in a distributed
lag model where additional lags of foreign aid are included on the right-hand
side of the estimating equation (columns (3)-(5)). In particular, the distributed
lag estimates (columns (3)-(5)) show that foreign aid has a positive and sta-
tistically signi￿cant e￿ect on GDP per capita growth on impact, and that the
lagged e￿ects are quantitatively smaller in size. The sum of the coe￿cients on
the contemporaneous and lagged log-changes of foreign aid is positive and sig-
ni￿cantly di￿erent from zero at the 1 percent level. Hence, a permanent increase
in foreign aid has a signi￿cant positive long-run e￿ect on the level of GDP per
capita. This result is consistent with the neoclassical Solow-Swan growth model
where part of the foreign aid is used to ￿nance domestic investment.
6 Conclusion
This paper showed as a ￿rst main result that increases in per capita GDP
growth of aid recipient countries are associated with a signi￿cant decrease in
26See for example Bond et al. (2010) and the references cited therein.
15foreign aid. Speci￿cally, the instrumental variables estimates yielded that a
1 percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth reduced foreign aid by
more than 4 percent on average. This ￿nding is consistent with the stylized
cross-country fact that as countries grow richer they rely less on foreign aid. It
is also consistent with donor countries acting as Good Samaritans.
The paper’s ￿nding of a quantitatively large, negative e￿ect of economic
growth on foreign aid bears an important implication for empirical research
on aid e￿ectiveness: OLS estimates which serve as a natural benchmark of
comparison to are biased against ￿nding a signi￿cant positive average e￿ect of
foreign aid on economic growth. Hence, insigni￿cant estimates of the e￿ect of
foreign aid on economic growth should be viewed with skepticism ￿ they may
just be a consequence of an inadequately addressed negative and quantitatively
large simultaneity bias.
As a second main ￿nding, the paper showed that after the large, negative
response of foreign aid to per capita GDP growth is accounted for that foreign
aid did indeed have a statistically signi￿cant positive e￿ect on per capita GDP
growth. This ￿nding contrasts to recent empirical papers that have failed to ￿nd
a signi￿cant positive average e￿ect of foreign aid on economic growth. Because
there is a strong tendency at the macroeconomic level for foreign aid to decrease
as per capita GDP growth of aid recipient countries increases, the cards are
stacked in empirical research against ￿nding a signi￿cant positive average e￿ect
of foreign aid on economic growth. Hence, if the reverse causality running
from higher per capita GDP to less foreign aid is not properly addressed, the
researcher may fail to ￿nd a signi￿cant positive average e￿ect of foreign aid
on economic growth and possibly conclude that foreign aid does not have a
systematic positive average e￿ect on per capita GDP growth.
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208 Technical Appendix
8.1 Adjustment of the Simultaneity Bias
This appendix shows formally why an instrumental variables estimator, that
uses the variation in foreign aid which is not driven by economic growth as an
instrumental variable for foreign aid is immune to the simultaneity bias. For
clarity, let us consider the simplest possible simultaneous equation model:
GDP = 1Aid + u (5)
Aid = 2GDP + e (6)
The probability limit of the OLS estimator of 1 in equation (5) is:
OLS









(2u + e) (8)
Hence, by substitution of equation (8) into (7) yields
OLS











where the second term on the right-hand side of equation (9) captures the si-
multaneity bias that arises if 2 6= 0 in equation (6), and the third term captures
the omitted variables bias.27
Suppose now that one is able to obtain a consistent estimate of 2 in equation
(6).28 Using this consistent estimate, one can construct an aid series Aid that
is adjusted for the endogenous response (i.e. Aid = Aid   2GDP) and use
this variable as an instrument for the original aid variable Aid in equation (5).












Hence, the IV estimator that uses the endogeneity adjusted aid series Aid as
an instrument for Aid does not su￿er from the simultaneity bias.
27To see that the third term in equation (9) captures the omitted variables bias, set 2 = 0.
In this case Aid = u and the probability limit of the OLS estimator is simply 1 +
cov(Aid;e)
var(Aid) .
28Of course, this can only be done by having a valid instrument for GDP in equation (6).
OLS cannot provide in equation (6) a consistent estimate for 2 if in equation (5) 1 6= 0.
218.2 Size of the Omitted Variables Bias
Regarding the size of the omitted variables bias of the IV estimator ( OV BIV )
that arises if cov(e;u) 6= 0, note that the second term in equation (10) simpli￿es
to




The third term in equation (9) that captures the omitted variables bias of the
least squares estimator (OV B IV ) simpli￿es to






1var(u) and the sign and size of 2cov(e;u), the omitted vari-
ables bias of the IV estimator may, therefore, be smaller or larger than the
omitted variables bias of the least squares estimator.
229 Data Appendix
23Table 1: The Effect of Economic Growth on Foreign Aid
(Baseline IV Estimates)
            Δln(y)                                                                        Δln(aid)                                                          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)






































Hansen J, p-value . . . 0.82 . . . 0.48
First Stage F-stat . . . 9.32 8.56 9.54 11.94 15.85
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550 1316
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is least squares; columns (4)-(8) two-stage least squares. t-values (in parentheses) are reported 
below the least-squares estimates; below two-stage least squares estimates p-values [in square brackets] are reported based on the Anderson-Rubin 
test of statistical significance. All test statistics are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental 
variables in columns (4)-(8) are the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and rainfall squared. Column (8) shows two-stage least 
squares estimates excluding all those country-year observations where countries experienced a drought year (as reported by the Catholique de 
Louvain's Emergency Disaster database). *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent 
confidence.
24Table 2. The Effect of Economic Growth on Foreign Aid
(Robustness of IV Estimates to Different Time Periods, Outliers, and Balanced Panel)
Δln(aid)
Panel A: IV-2SLS Estimates























Hansen J, p-value 0.49 0.54 0.91 0.96 0.68
First Stage F-stat 7.76 10.08 8.14 10.08 8.60
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 21 21 47 39 39
Panel B: LS Estimates























Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 21 21 47 39 39
Note: The method of estimation in Panel A is two-stage least squares; Panel B least squares. The p-values [in square brackets] in Panel A are based on 
the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. All test statistics are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. 
The instrumental variables for the two-stage least squares regressions in Panel A are the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and 
rainfall squared. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
25Table 3: The Effect of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth
(Baseline IV Estimates)
Δln(y)
Panel A: IV-2SLS Estimates



























First-Stage F-stat 92.03 55.77 106.85 78.16 31.52 141.78
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39
Panel B: LS Estimates



























Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39
Note: The method of estimation in Panel A is two-stage least squares; Panel B least squares. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard 
errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable for the two-stage least squares estimation in Panel A is the foreign aid series 
that is adjusted for the reverse effect that per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid. See Section 2.2 for a detailed explanation of this estimation 
strategy.  All regressions control for the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and rainfall squared (estimates not shown). *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
26Table 4: The Effect of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth
(Controlling for Changes in Political Institutions and the Incidence of Civil War)
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Δln(y)



















































First-Stage F-stat 130.71 43.47 76.49 191.15 23.39 181.16
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1265 800 793 1093 984 972
Countries 39 20 20 39 34 34
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Δln(aid)



















































First-Stage F-stat 5.71 6.89 8.31 4.86 5.77 4.22
Hansen p-value 0.45 0.68 0.70 0.24 0.29 0.28
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1265 800 793 1093 984 972
Countries 39 20 20 39 34 34
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The instrumental variable for the two-stage least squares estimation in Panel A is the 
foreign aid series that is adjusted for the reverse effect that per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid. See Section 2.2 for a detailed explanation of 
this estimation strategy. The instrumental variables for the two-stage least squares estimation in Panel B are the log-changes in the commodity price 
index, rainfall, and rainfall squared. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
27Table 5: The Effect of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth
(Investment Response)
Δln(i)



























First-Stage F-Statistic 92.03 55.77 106.85 78.16 31.52 141.78
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
country level. The instrumental variable for the two-stage least squares estimation is the foreign aid series that is adjusted for the reverse effect that 
per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid. See Section 2.2 in the paper for a detailed explanation of this estimation strategy. All regressions control 
for the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and rainfall squared (estimates not shown). *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
Table 6: The Effect of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth
(Using the Share of Aid in GDP and Controlling for Convergence Effects)
Δln(y)







































First-Stage F-Statistic 49.19 25.75 47.84 37.64 15.34 63.99
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39
Note: The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). t-values (in brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable for the share of foreign aid in GDP is the share of foreign aid in GDP that is adjusted for the 
reverse effect that per capita GDP growth has on the share of foreign aid in GDP. See Section 2.2 in the paper for a detailed explanation of this 
estimation strategy. All regressions control for the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and rainfall squared (estimates not shown). 
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
28Table 7: The Effect of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth
(Level Effects vs. Growth Effects)
Δln(y)



























































First-Stage F-Statistic 7.54 7.27 6.84 6.79 6.34
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 1497 1488 1440 1425
Countries 47 47 47 47 47
Note: The method of estimation in column (1) is two-stage least squares; columns (2)-(5) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). t-values (in 
brackets) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable for foreign aid is the foreign aid 
series that is adjusted for the reverse effect that per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid. The instrumental variable for lagged GDP per capita 
growth is the second and third lag of GDP per capita. All regressions control for the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and rainfall 
squared (estimates not shown). *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
29Figure 1. Distribution of Country-Specific Slope Estimates
Note: The figure shows the density function of the country-specific slope estimates 
that are obtained by applying the Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean-group estimator 
and instrumenting the foreign aid series by the residual variation in foreign aid that 
is not driven by economic growth. The density function is estimated using an 
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Country-Specific Slope EstimatesFigure 2. The Role of Macroeconomic Policies
Note. The figure shows the relationship between the country-specific slope 
estimates (reported in Figure 1) and the Burnside and Dollar (2000) policy 
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Burnside and Dollar (2000) Policy IndexFigure 3. The Role of Tropical Terrain
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the country-specific slope 
estimates (reported in Figure 1) and the share of tropical terrain. The 
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Share of Tropical TerrainFigure 4. The Role of Financing Constraints
Panel A: Credit Information
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the country-specific slope 
estimates (reported in Figure 1) and World Bank credit information indicator. 
Higher values of the credit information indicator represent better credit 
information. The bootstrapped slope coefficient (s.e.) of the fitted regression 



















































0 1 2 3 4
World Bank Credit Information IndicatorPanel B: Credit Depth
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the country-specific slope 
estimates (reported in Figure 1) and the ratio of public and private credit to 













































.05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Credit to GDP RatioPanel C: Percent of Population Living in Rural Areas
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the country-specific slope 
estimates (reported in Figure 1) and the percentage share of the population 
living in rural regions. The bootstrapped slope coefficient (s.e.) of the fitted 
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Share of Population Living in Rural AreasFigure 5: The Role of Ethnic Divisions
Panel A: Ethnic Fractionalization
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the country-specific slope 
estimates (reported in Figure 1) and ethnic fractionalization. The bootstrapped 
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Ethnic FractionalizationPanel B: Ethnic Polarization
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the country-specific slope 
estimates (reported in Figure 1) and ethnic polarization. The bootstrapped 
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Ethnic PolarizationAppendix Table A1: Weak IV Robust Estimators
Δln(aid)

























































First-Stage F-Statistic 9.32 7.76 10.03 8.14 10.08 8.18
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39
Note: The method of estimation in the first (second) row is the Fuller (1977, Econometrica) modified LIML estimator, with an alpha constant set 
equal to 1 (4). In the third row the method of estimation is the Hansen et al. (1996, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics) continuously updated 
GMM estimator. t-values (in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variables 
are the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and rainfall squared. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 
percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
38Appendix Table A2: Results Using Temperature Data as an IV




























Hansen p-value 0.93 0.69 0.73 0.68 0.94 0.44
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39


















































Joint F-statistic 7.84 5.85 7.53 7.52 8.57 13.02
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The instrumental variable for the two-stage least squares estimation in Panel A are the log-
changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, rainfall squared, and temperature. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 
percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
39Appendix Table 3: Reduced Form Estimates Using Residual Aid
Δln(y)



























Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1550 819 811 1341 1170 1150
Countries 47 21 21 47 39 39
fff
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Residual aid refers to the  foreign aid series that is adjusted for the reverse effect that per capita GDP 
growth has on foreign aid. See Section 2.2 for a detailed explanation of this estimation strategy. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
Appendix Table 4: Estimates For Sub-Saharan African Countries 
                           Δln(aid)                                    Δln(y)                

















First-Stage F-Stat 11.91 8.73 274.19 60.24
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1766 1261 1766 1261
Countries 47 33 47 33
Note: The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The instrumental variable for the two-stage least squares estimation in columns (1) and (2) 
are the log-changes in the commodity price index, rainfall, and rainfall squared. The instrumental variable for the two-stage least squares estimation in 
columns (3) and (4) is the foreign aid series that is adjusted for the reverse effect that per capita GDP growth has on foreign aid. See Section 2.2 for a 
detailed explanation of this estimation strategy. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent 
confidence. 
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